

SRI SRI ACADEMY, KOLKATA
MODEL UNITED NATIONS 2021



JOINT CRISIS CABINET 1 - THE SINO-SOVIET
SPLIT

SSMUN'21 STUDY GUIDE

THE MAOIST CABINET

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Index

Sl. No.	Topic
1.	Welcome Remark
2.	About the Committee
3.	Introduction
4.	Important Events
5.	Projects pertinent to Chinese national interest
6.	Additional Resources

Welcome Remark

Honourable Delegates,

A very warm welcome to all the delegates. This committee, The Maoist Cabinet of the Joint Crisis Committee will be fast paced, multi-faceted and interesting. It is my belief that despite the dictatorial nature of Mao's CPC, events like project 571 make it evident that this cabinet had people with various levels of influence and varying ideologies. The history behind the Sino-Soviet split is interesting and deepens our understanding of how modern-day communism has come to be. In this eventful timeline, I wish to ascertain how a delegate would react when handed the responsibility, to determine the course a budding country has to take. This study guide is a tool to understand where China stands amidst the chaos of the split. We encourage delegates to also understand the opinions of their allotments as and when they are released. This can be established by looking at the lives of said cabinet members. We firmly encourage delegates to dive deeper into the events covered in the study guide as they are of utmost importance and complex in nature. This would ensure everyone's active participation in the committee and stimulating debates. It is the executive board's aim to facilitate the personal growth of delegates, so do not hesitate in asking questions. From past events and ongoing scenarios, it is expected of a delegate to understand the major challenges involved with the Sino-Soviet Union. This translates in real life to understanding the nature of conflicts and goal-oriented problem solving. It is my hope that delegates remember Sri Sri Academy Model United Nations 2021 as a fun, learning and bonding experience and leave with a satisfied mind and beautiful memories.

**Regards,
Aditya Joshi,
Chairperson.**

About the committee

Since the committee is in the form of a Cabinet, we will be defining a few documents that will be required throughout the committee.

a) Action Orders

These documents will serve as a way for the cabinet to issue an immediate response in the event of a crisis/update or as an official response by the PRC to a public statement. They will have no particular format. An Action Order will only be passed by the committee if it is agreed upon by one-half of the cabinet including Mao Zedong. If Mao Zedong withdraws approval, a two-thirds majority will be required.

b) Communiques

Communiques are an essential part of any crisis committee as they determine the course of future updates. It is recommended for a delegate to become well versed with this document especially for this particular committee. The conference handbook contains the detailed description of a communique, however, if a delegate has further queries, they can contact the Executive Board.

c) Working Paper

This will be the final paperwork in the committee and will take the role of a resolution. It too will have no particular format and can be delivered in the form of simple clauses. Any questions regarding this document will be clarified during the committee and further instructions may be issued depending on the situation.

To be additionally noted, delegates will be marked at how well they understand the role and opinions of their allotments (as a trade-off of country portfolio).

Introduction

This cabinet seeks to establish the final outcome of the Sino-Soviet split. Whether that be an all-out war, reconciliation and consequent re-union or something in between. It also carries undertones of the philosophy behind dictatorial regimes, their internal politics and inherent instability.

This committee will delve deeper into and give answers to whether the split was due to an inherent flaw in Marxism or just a by-product of diverging national interests. It will seek to rewrite history in a manner most conducive to the great nation of China. The updates will revolve around internal politics as well as interactions and diplomatic relations with other countries.

Important Events

1. Events leading up to the Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship (1950) –

During the second World War, China was in a state of civil war. But, to expel Imperial Japan from China, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the nationalist Kuomintang party (KMT) set aside their civil war. After the surrender of Japan, the civil war resumed and was won by the communists in 1949. In respect for the USSR-KMT treaty of friendship and communist solidarity, Mao Zedong, leader of the CPC did not seize political power immediately. However, with Chiang's opposition to the soviet annexation of Tannu Uriankhi (Mongolia), Joseph Stalin voided the treaty of friendship by entering Manchuria.

2. Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship –

Three months after the PRC was established in October 1949, Mao and his delegation travelled to Moscow. They were not received warmly by Stalin, who doubted if they really were Marxist-Leninists and not simply a group of Chinese nationalists. He had also recognized Chiang Kai-Shek's government, and furthermore distrusted any communist movement that was not under his direct control. Eventually, a frustrated Mao was ready to go home, but Zhou Enlai refused to leave without a formal agreement. Thus, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Friendship was signed and the Chinese at last departed in February 1950. Thus, Mao and Stalin safeguarded the national interests of China and the Soviet Union with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The treaty improved the two country's geopolitical relationship on political, military and economic levels. Stalin's largesse to Mao included a loan for \$300 million; military aid, should Japan attack the PRC; and the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, Port Arthur and Dalian to Chinese control. In return, the PRC recognized the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. Despite the favourable terms, the treaty of socialist friendship included the PRC to the geopolitical hegemony of the USSR, but unlike the governments of the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, the USSR did not control Mao's government. In six years, the great differences between the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations and applications of Marxism–Leninism voided the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

3. The Death of Stalin and Temporary reparation of sino-soviet relations (1953-1955) –

After the death of Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev was appointed the Premier. Using Trade agreements, a formal acknowledgement of Stalin's Economic unfairness to the PRC, fifteen industrial-development projects, and exchanges of technicians and political advisors, he repaired relations between the USSR and PRC. There existed personal and ideological differences between Khrushchev and Mao in spite of which by 1955, 60% of PRC's exports went to the USSR. This was also the time when the PRC launched its first

five-year plan (1953-1957) that stressed on rapid industrial development with soviet assistance. The plan also focussed on converting China's industry into a socialist structure as soon as possible.

4. **Khrushchev's *On the cult of personality and its consequences* speech and subsequent de-Stalinization of the USSR (1956)** –

On the momentous day of 25th February, 1956, Khrushchev made the "Secret Speech" to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This can arguably be called the tipping point of sino-soviet relations. Despite Stalin's initial distrust for the CPC, Mao Zedong admired Stalin and was himself a cult of personality leader. The Soviet Union lost ideological credibility and political authority in the eyes of Mao when the CPSU changed its ideological orientation from Stalin's confrontation of the west to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence with it. For Mao's PRC, the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was the last straw, following which the CPC denounced the USSR's de-Stalinization as revisionism, and reaffirmed the Stalinist ideology, policies, and practices of Mao's government as the correct course for achieving socialism in China. This fractured the western perception of "monolithic communism" in the eastern bloc.

5. **Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Great Leap forward (1958-1960)** –

The year 1958 brought to light some conflicting national interests between the PRC and the USSR. The first instance of this was when negotiations regarding joint Sino-soviet naval bases in China failed as Mao accused Khrushchev of trying to impinge on China's sovereign control over its own coast line. Then followed the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, which was a time of great international turmoil. After losing the civil war in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang party (KMT) escaped to Taiwan and formed the Republic of China (ROC). Mao started shelling the islands of Matsu and Kinmen in an attempt to bring Taiwan under its control. In launching that regional war,

Mao did not inform Khrushchev. Formal, ideological response to that geopolitical contingency compelled Khrushchev to revise the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence to include regional wars, such as the recent Taiwan crisis. Mao's withholding of information from Khrushchev worsened their personal-political relations, especially because the US threatened nuclear war upon China and the USSR, if the PRC invaded Taiwan; thus did Mao's continual shoot-outs with Chiang Kai-shek impel Khrushchev into Sino-American quarrels about the long-lost civil war in China. In late 1958, the CPC revived Mao's guerrilla-period cult of personality to portray *Chairman Mao* as the charismatic, visionary leader solely qualified to control the policy, administration, and popular mobilization required to realize the Great Leap Forward to industrialize China. In the period of 1958-1959, Khrushchev lost political trustworthiness in the eyes of Mao as an orthodox Marxist. Two events can be attributed to this: (a) USSR withdrew technical aid to develop nuclear weapons under project 596 after meeting with the United States to decrease US-Soviet tensions. (b) They sided with India in the Sino-Indian war.

6. **Soviet-Albanian split and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1960-1963)** -

The USSR broke diplomatic relations with Albania in December 1961. Albania was a devout follower of Stalinism, and labelled Khrushchev's attempts to defame Stalin's work as revisionism and deviant from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. This split escalated Sino-soviet conflicts from political-party level to national-government level as it documented the ideological differences between Sino-soviet interpretations of Communism. Presently, Khrushchev's refusal to go to war with the United States over the Cuban Missiles Crisis is regarded as the final reason for the Sino-Soviet Split. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral, military stand-down. Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East-West nuclear war. For the Western powers, the averted atomic war threatened by the Cuban Missile Crisis made nuclear disarmament

their political priority. To that end, the US, the UK, and the USSR agreed to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which formally forbade nuclear-detonation tests in the Earth's atmosphere, in outer space, and under water – yet did allow the underground testing and detonation of atomic bombs. In that time, the PRC's nuclear-weapons program, Project 596, was nascent, and Mao perceived the test-ban treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to thwart the PRC's becoming a nuclear superpower. As a final attempt to salvage relations, between July 6-20, 1963, a series of Soviet-Chinese negotiations were held in Moscow. However, both sides maintained their own ideological views and, therefore, negotiations failed.

Projects pertinent to Chinese national interest

1. Great leap forward (1958-1962) –

Under Mao's leadership, China broke with the Soviet model and announced a new economic program, the "Great Leap Forward", in 1958, aimed at rapidly raising industrial and agricultural production. Specific to industrial production, Mao announced the goal of surpassing the steel production output of Great Britain by 1968. Giant cooperatives, otherwise known as people's communes, were formed. Within a year almost all Chinese villages had been reformed into working communes of several thousand people in size, where people would live and work together as envisioned by an ideal communist society. Rather than build steel mills, small "backyard furnaces" would be used. The results, however, were disastrous. Normal market mechanisms were disrupted, agricultural production fell behind, and people exhausted themselves producing shoddy, unsellable goods. Because of the reliance on the government providing and distributing food and resources and their rapid depletion due to poor planning, starvation appeared even in fertile agricultural areas. From 1960 to 1961, the combination of poor planning during the Great Leap Forward,

political movements incited by the government, as well as unusual weather patterns and natural disasters resulted in widespread famine and many deaths. A significant number of the deaths were not from famine but were killed or overworked by the authorities. According to various sources, the resulting death toll was likely between 20 and 40 million. The steel produced in backyard furnaces at low temperatures proved to be useless. The great leap forward was a source of intense criticism for Mao from within the party and created dissent.

2. **Two bombs, one satellite (1956-1967)** –

China's first space exploration and nuclear weapons program was created in 1956 with the objective of developing an atomic bomb, a hydrogen bomb and a carrier missile. It was proposed by Mao Zedong in 1955 and a plan was outlined by experts in 1956. Soviet assistance was provided for the development of the atomic bomb since 1955 and in 1957, China and the USSR signed an agreement on sharing defence technology that involved an atomic bomb prototype being supplied by Moscow to Beijing, technical data, and an exchange of hundreds of Russian and Chinese scientists. However, in 1959, the Soviet Union was also engaged in test ban negotiations with the United States in order to relax Soviet-American tensions. After the negotiations, on June 20, 1959 Nikita Khrushchev decided to stop helping the Chinese with their nuclear program. Mao then shifted towards a policy of self-reliance and named the nuclear program Project 596. The United States feared that a "nuclear China" would imbalance the bi-polar Cold War between the US and the USSR. To keep the PRC from achieving the geopolitical status of a nuclear power, the US administrations of both John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson considered ways either to sabotage or to directly attack the Chinese nuclear program — aided either by Nationalist China or by the USSR. To avert nuclear war, Khrushchev refused the US offer to participate in a US-Soviet pre-emptive attack against the PRC.

Additional Resources

This study guide lists the events leading up to the freeze date and the main national projects that influence Chinese foreign relations as of June 1964. Usually, study guides pertaining to crisis committees end before the freeze date. If a delegate wishes to gain an even more in-depth knowledge of the split, they have a lot to gain from knowing the history of the PRC from 1964-1980 in brief. It will allow them to relate to the updates in the committee and the political dynamics of the CPC.

Topics that can briefly touched upon include:

- a. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
- b. Project 596 (Post June 1964)
- c. Project 571

It is to be noted that delegates can use Wikipedia in researching for this committee. This has been allowed because most of the information about the split is in the form of books and abstract articles or in native Chinese languages. However, any article featuring China after June 1964 cannot be referred to in the committee as the timeline is yet to take place.

Broaden your vision, deepen your roots